Retrieving access information in a dispersed storage network

ABSTRACT

A method begins by a processing module obtaining a set of recovered random numbers, decoding encrypted share slices to produce a set of encrypted shares, and obtaining a set of personalized authenticating values regarding user access to data. The method continues with the processing module generating a set of hidden passwords based on the set of personalized authenticating values, generating a set of blinded passwords based on the set of hidden passwords and a set of blinded random numbers, and generating a set of passkeys based on the set of blinded passwords and the set of recovered random numbers. The method continues with the processing module generating a set of decryption keys based on the set of blinded random numbers and the set of passkeys, decrypting the set of encrypted shares to produce a set of shares, and decoding the set of shares to reproduce the data.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENTS

The present U.S. Utility Patent Application claims priority pursuant to35 U.S.C. §120, as a continuation, to the following U.S. Utility PatentApplication, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety and made part of the present U.S. Utility Patent Applicationfor all purposes:

1. U.S. Utility Application Ser. No. 13/197,998, entitled “RETRIEVINGACCESS INFORMATION IN A DISPERSED STORAGE NETWORK,” (Attorney Docket No.CS00594), filed Aug. 4, 2011, issuing as U.S. Pat. No. 8,621,580 on Dec.31, 2013, which claims priority pursuant to:

(a) 35 USC §120 as a continuation-in-part patent application ofco-pending patent application entitled “STORAGE OF SENSITIVE DATA IN ADISPERSED STORAGE NETWORK, ” having a filing date of Apr. 9, 2011, and aSer. No. 13/097,396 (Attorney Docket No. CS00512), which claims priorityunder 35 USC §119(e) to a provisionally filed patent applicationentitled “DISPERSED STORAGE NETWORK MEMORY DEVICE UTILIZATION,” having aprovisional filing date of May 19, 2010, and a provisional Ser. No.61/346,173 (Attorney Docket No. CS00336) all of which are incorporatedherein by reference in their entirety and made part of the present U.S.Utility Patent Application for all purposes; and

(b) U.S. Utility Application Ser. No. 13/197,998 also claims prioritypursuant to 35 U.S.C. §119(e) to U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No.61/377,413, entitled “ACCESS INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION UTILIZINGDISTRIBUTED AUTHENTICATION,” (Attorney Docket No. CS00593), filed Aug.26, 2010, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety and made part of the present U.S. Utility Patent Applicationfor all purposes.

STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT—NOTAPPLICABLE INCORPORATION-BY-REFERENCE OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED ON A COMPACTDISC—NOT APPLICABLE BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Technical Field of the Invention

This invention relates generally to computing systems and moreparticularly to data storage solutions within such computing systems.

2. Description of Related Art

Computers are known to communicate, process, and store data. Suchcomputers range from wireless smart phones to data centers that supportmillions of web searches, stock trades, or on-line purchases every day.In general, a computing system generates data and/or manipulates datafrom one form into another. For instance, an image sensor of thecomputing system generates raw picture data and, using an imagecompression program (e.g., JPEG, MPEG, etc.), the computing systemmanipulates the raw picture data into a standardized compressed image.

With continued advances in processing speed and communication speed,computers are capable of processing real time multimedia data forapplications ranging from simple voice communications to streaming highdefinition video. As such, general-purpose information appliances arereplacing purpose-built communications devices (e.g., a telephone). Forexample, smart phones can support telephony communications but they arealso capable of text messaging and accessing the internet to performfunctions including email, web browsing, remote applications access, andmedia communications (e.g., telephony voice, image transfer, musicfiles, video files, real time video streaming, etc.).

Each type of computer is constructed and operates in accordance with oneor more communication, processing, and storage standards. As a result ofstandardization and with advances in technology, more and moreinformation content is being converted into digital formats. Forexample, more digital cameras are now being sold than film cameras, thusproducing more digital pictures. As another example, web-basedprogramming is becoming an alternative to over the air televisionbroadcasts and/or cable broadcasts. As further examples, papers, books,video entertainment, home video, etc., are now being stored digitally,which increases the demand on the storage function of computers.

A typical computer storage system includes one or more memory devicesaligned with the needs of the various operational aspects of thecomputer's processing and communication functions. Generally, theimmediacy of access dictates what type of memory device is used. Forexample, random access memory (RAM) memory can be accessed in any randomorder with a constant response time, thus it is typically used for cachememory and main memory. By contrast, memory device technologies thatrequire physical movement such as magnetic disks, tapes, and opticaldiscs, have a variable response time as the physical movement can takelonger than the data transfer, thus they are typically used forsecondary memory (e.g., hard drive, backup memory, etc.).

A computer's storage system will be compliant with one or more computerstorage standards that include, but are not limited to, network filesystem (NFS), flash file system (FFS), disk file system (DFS), smallcomputer system interface (SCSI), internet small computer systeminterface (iSCSI), file transfer protocol (FTP), and web-baseddistributed authoring and versioning (WebDAV). These standards specifythe data storage format (e.g., files, data objects, data blocks,directories, etc.) and interfacing between the computer's processingfunction and its storage system, which is a primary function of thecomputer's memory controller.

Despite the standardization of the computer and its storage system,memory devices fail; especially commercial grade memory devices thatutilize technologies incorporating physical movement (e.g., a discdrive). For example, it is fairly common for a disc drive to routinelysuffer from bit level corruption and to completely fail after threeyears of use. One solution is to a higher-grade disc drive, which addssignificant cost to a computer.

Another solution is to utilize multiple levels of redundant disc drivesto replicate the data into two or more copies. One such redundant driveapproach is called redundant array of independent discs (RAID). In aRAID device, a RAID controller adds parity data to the original databefore storing it across the array. The parity data is calculated fromthe original data such that the failure of a disc will not result in theloss of the original data. For example, RAID 5 uses three discs toprotect data from the failure of a single disc. The parity data, andassociated redundancy overhead data, reduces the storage capacity ofthree independent discs by one third (e.g., n−1=capacity). RAID 6 canrecover from a loss of two discs and requires a minimum of four discswith a storage capacity of n−2.

While RAID addresses the memory device failure issue, it is not withoutits own failures issues that affect its effectiveness, efficiency andsecurity. For instance, as more discs are added to the array, theprobability of a disc failure increases, which increases the demand formaintenance. For example, when a disc fails, it needs to be manuallyreplaced before another disc fails and the data stored in the RAIDdevice is lost. To reduce the risk of data loss, data on a RAID deviceis typically copied on to one or more other RAID devices. While thisaddresses the loss of data issue, it raises a security issue sincemultiple copies of data are available, which increases the chances ofunauthorized access. Further, as the amount of data being stored grows,the overhead of RAID devices becomes a non-trivial efficiency issue.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWING(S)

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a computingsystem in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a computing corein accordance with the invention;

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a distributedstorage processing unit in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a grid module inaccordance with the invention;

FIG. 5 is a diagram of an example embodiment of error coded data slicecreation in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of an accessinformation storage system in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating an example of storing accessinformation in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating another example of storing accessinformation in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of an accessinformation retrieval system in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating an example of retrieving accessinformation in accordance with the invention;

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of retrieving andutilizing access information in accordance with the invention; and

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating an example of generating a passkeyin accordance with the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a computing system 10 thatincludes one or more of a first type of user devices 12, one or more ofa second type of user devices 14, at least one distributed storage (DS)processing unit 16, at least one DS managing unit 18, at least onestorage integrity processing unit 20, and a distributed storage network(DSN) memory 22 coupled via a network 24. The network 24 may include oneor more wireless and/or wire lined communication systems; one or moreprivate intranet systems and/or public internet systems; and/or one ormore local area networks (LAN) and/or wide area networks (WAN).

The DSN memory 22 includes a plurality of distributed storage (DS) units36 for storing data of the system. Each of the DS units 36 includes aprocessing module and memory and may be located at a geographicallydifferent site than the other DS units (e.g., one in Chicago, one inMilwaukee, etc.). The processing module may be a single processingdevice or a plurality of processing devices. Such a processing devicemay be a microprocessor, micro-controller, digital signal processor,microcomputer, central processing unit, field programmable gate array,programmable logic device, state machine, logic circuitry, analogcircuitry, digital circuitry, and/or any device that manipulates signals(analog and/or digital) based on hard coding of the circuitry and/oroperational instructions. The processing module may have an associatedmemory and/or memory element, which may be a single memory device, aplurality of memory devices, and/or embedded circuitry of the processingmodule. Such a memory device may be a read-only memory, random accessmemory, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, static memory, dynamicmemory, flash memory, cache memory, and/or any device that storesdigital information. Note that if the processing module includes morethan one processing device, the processing devices may be centrallylocated (e.g., directly coupled together via a wired and/or wireless busstructure) or may be distributedly located (e.g., cloud computing viaindirect coupling via a local area network and/or a wide area network).Further note that when the processing module implements one or more ofits functions via a state machine, analog circuitry, digital circuitry,and/or logic circuitry, the memory and/or memory element storing thecorresponding operational instructions may be embedded within, orexternal to, the circuitry comprising the state machine, analogcircuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logic circuitry. Still further notethat, the memory element stores, and the processing module executes,hard coded and/or operational instructions corresponding to at leastsome of the steps and/or functions illustrated in FIGS. 1-12.

Each of the user devices 12-14, the DS processing unit 16, the DSmanaging unit 18, and the storage integrity processing unit 20 may be aportable computing device (e.g., a social networking device, a gamingdevice, a cell phone, a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, adigital music player, a digital video player, a laptop computer, ahandheld computer, a video game controller, and/or any other portabledevice that includes a computing core) and/or a fixed computing device(e.g., a personal computer, a computer server, a cable set-top box, asatellite receiver, a television set, a printer, a fax machine, homeentertainment equipment, a video game console, and/or any type of homeor office computing equipment). Such a portable or fixed computingdevice includes a computing core 26 and one or more interfaces 30, 32,and/or 33. An embodiment of the computing core 26 will be described withreference to FIG. 2.

With respect to the interfaces, each of the interfaces 30, 32, and 33includes software and/or hardware to support one or more communicationlinks via the network 24 and/or directly. For example, interfaces 30support a communication link (wired, wireless, direct, via a LAN, viathe network 24, etc.) between the first type of user device 14 and theDS processing unit 16. As another example, DSN interface 32 supports aplurality of communication links via the network 24 between the DSNmemory 22 and the DS processing unit 16, the first type of user device12, and/or the storage integrity processing unit 20. As yet anotherexample, interface 33 supports a communication link between the DSmanaging unit 18 and any one of the other devices and/or units 12, 14,16, 20, and/or 22 via the network 24.

In general and with respect to data storage, the system 10 supportsthree primary functions: distributed network data storage management,distributed data storage and retrieval, and data storage integrityverification. In accordance with these three primary functions, data canbe distributedly stored in a plurality of physically different locationsand subsequently retrieved in a reliable and secure manner regardless offailures of individual storage devices, failures of network equipment,the duration of storage, the amount of data being stored, attempts athacking the data, etc.

The DS managing unit 18 performs distributed network data storagemanagement functions, which include establishing distributed datastorage parameters, performing network operations, performing networkadministration, and/or performing network maintenance. The DS managingunit 18 establishes the distributed data storage parameters (e.g.,allocation of virtual DSN memory space, distributed storage parameters,security parameters, billing information, user profile information,etc.) for one or more of the user devices 12-14 (e.g., established forindividual devices, established for a user group of devices, establishedfor public access by the user devices, etc.). For example, the DSmanaging unit 18 coordinates the creation of a vault (e.g., a virtualmemory block) within the DSN memory 22 for a user device (for a group ofdevices, or for public access). The DS managing unit 18 also determinesthe distributed data storage parameters for the vault. In particular,the DS managing unit 18 determines a number of slices (e.g., the numberthat a data segment of a data file and/or data block is partitioned intofor distributed storage) and a read threshold value (e.g., the minimumnumber of slices required to reconstruct the data segment).

As another example, the DS managing module 18 creates and stores,locally or within the DSN memory 22, user profile information. The userprofile information includes one or more of authentication information,permissions, and/or the security parameters. The security parameters mayinclude one or more of encryption/decryption scheme, one or moreencryption keys, key generation scheme, and data encoding/decodingscheme.

As yet another example, the DS managing unit 18 creates billinginformation for a particular user, user group, vault access, publicvault access, etc. For instance, the DS managing unit 18 tracks thenumber of times user accesses a private vault and/or public vaults,which can be used to generate a per-access bill. In another instance,the DS managing unit 18 tracks the amount of data stored and/orretrieved by a user device and/or a user group, which can be used togenerate a per-data-amount bill.

The DS managing unit 18 also performs network operations, networkadministration, and/or network maintenance. As at least part ofperforming the network operations and/or administration, the DS managingunit 18 monitors performance of the devices and/or units of the system10 for potential failures, determines the devices and/or unit'sactivation status, determines the devices' and/or units' loading, andany other system level operation that affects the performance level ofthe system 10. For example, the DS managing unit 18 receives andaggregates network management alarms, alerts, errors, statusinformation, performance information, and messages from the devices12-14 and/or the units 16, 20, 22. For example, the DS managing unit 18receives a simple network management protocol (SNMP) message regardingthe status of the DS processing unit 16.

The DS managing unit 18 performs the network maintenance by identifyingequipment within the system 10 that needs replacing, upgrading,repairing, and/or expanding. For example, the DS managing unit 18determines that the DSN memory 22 needs more DS units 36 or that one ormore of the DS units 36 needs updating.

The second primary function (i.e., distributed data storage andretrieval) begins and ends with a user device 12-14. For instance, if asecond type of user device 14 has a data file 38 and/or data block 40 tostore in the DSN memory 22, it send the data file 38 and/or data block40 to the DS processing unit 16 via its interface 30. As will bedescribed in greater detail with reference to FIG. 2, the interface 30functions to mimic a conventional operating system (OS) file systeminterface (e.g., network file system (NFS), flash file system (FFS),disk file system (DFS), file transfer protocol (FTP), web-baseddistributed authoring and versioning (WebDAV), etc.) and/or a blockmemory interface (e.g., small computer system interface (SCSI), internetsmall computer system interface (iSCSI), etc.). In addition, theinterface 30 may attach a user identification code (ID) to the data file38 and/or data block 40.

The DS processing unit 16 receives the data file 38 and/or data block 40via its interface 30 and performs a distributed storage (DS) process 34thereon (e.g., an error coding dispersal storage function). The DSprocessing 34 begins by partitioning the data file 38 and/or data block40 into one or more data segments, which is represented as Y datasegments. For example, the DS processing 34 may partition the data file38 and/or data block 40 into a fixed byte size segment (e.g., 2¹ to2^(n) bytes, where n=>2) or a variable byte size (e.g., change byte sizefrom segment to segment, or from groups of segments to groups ofsegments, etc.).

For each of the Y data segments, the DS processing 34 error encodes(e.g., forward error correction (FEC), information dispersal algorithm,or error correction coding) and slices (or slices then error encodes)the data segment into a plurality of error coded (EC) data slices 42-48,which is represented as X slices per data segment. The number of slices(X) per segment, which corresponds to a number of pillars n, is set inaccordance with the distributed data storage parameters and the errorcoding scheme. For example, if a Reed-Solomon (or other FEC scheme) isused in an n/k system, then a data segment is divided into n slices,where k number of slices is needed to reconstruct the original data(i.e., k is the threshold). As a few specific examples, the n/k factormay be 5/3; 6/4; 8/6; 8/5; 16/10.

For each slice 42-48, the DS processing unit 16 creates a unique slicename and appends it to the corresponding slice 42-48. The slice nameincludes universal DSN memory addressing routing information (e.g.,virtual memory addresses in the DSN memory 22) and user-specificinformation (e.g., user ID, file name, data block identifier, etc.).

The DS processing unit 16 transmits the plurality of EC slices 42-48 toa plurality of DS units 36 of the DSN memory 22 via the DSN interface 32and the network 24. The DSN interface 32 formats each of the slices fortransmission via the network 24. For example, the DSN interface 32 mayutilize an internet protocol (e.g., TCP/IP, etc.) to packetize theslices 42-48 for transmission via the network 24.

The number of DS units 36 receiving the slices 42-48 is dependent on thedistributed data storage parameters established by the DS managing unit18. For example, the DS managing unit 18 may indicate that each slice isto be stored in a different DS unit 36. As another example, the DSmanaging unit 18 may indicate that like slice numbers of different datasegments are to be stored in the same DS unit 36. For example, the firstslice of each of the data segments is to be stored in a first DS unit36, the second slice of each of the data segments is to be stored in asecond DS unit 36, etc. In this manner, the data is encoded anddistributedly stored at physically diverse locations to improved datastorage integrity and security. Further examples of encoding the datasegments will be provided with reference to one or more of FIGS. 2-12.

Each DS unit 36 that receives a slice 42-48 for storage translates thevirtual DSN memory address of the slice into a local physical addressfor storage. Accordingly, each DS unit 36 maintains a virtual tophysical memory mapping to assist in the storage and retrieval of data.

The first type of user device 12 performs a similar function to storedata in the DSN memory 22 with the exception that it includes the DSprocessing. As such, the device 12 encodes and slices the data fileand/or data block it has to store. The device then transmits the slices11 to the DSN memory via its DSN interface 32 and the network 24.

For a second type of user device 14 to retrieve a data file or datablock from memory, it issues a read command via its interface 30 to theDS processing unit 16. The DS processing unit 16 performs the DSprocessing 34 to identify the DS units 36 storing the slices of the datafile and/or data block based on the read command. The DS processing unit16 may also communicate with the DS managing unit 18 to verify that theuser device 14 is authorized to access the requested data.

Assuming that the user device is authorized to access the requesteddata, the DS processing unit 16 issues slice read commands to at least athreshold number of the DS units 36 storing the requested data (e.g., toat least 10 DS units for a 16/10 error coding scheme). Each of the DSunits 36 receiving the slice read command, verifies the command,accesses its virtual to physical memory mapping, retrieves the requestedslice, or slices, and transmits it to the DS processing unit 16.

Once the DS processing unit 16 has received a read threshold number ofslices for a data segment, it performs an error decoding function andde-slicing to reconstruct the data segment. When Y number of datasegments has been reconstructed, the DS processing unit 16 provides thedata file 38 and/or data block 40 to the user device 14. Note that thefirst type of user device 12 performs a similar process to retrieve adata file and/or data block.

The storage integrity processing unit 20 performs the third primaryfunction of data storage integrity verification. In general, the storageintegrity processing unit 20 periodically retrieves slices 45, and/orslice names, of a data file or data block of a user device to verifythat one or more slices have not been corrupted or lost (e.g., the DSunit failed). The retrieval process mimics the read process previouslydescribed.

If the storage integrity processing unit 20 determines that one or moreslices is corrupted or lost, it rebuilds the corrupted or lost slice(s)in accordance with the error coding scheme. The storage integrityprocessing unit 20 stores the rebuild slice, or slices, in theappropriate DS unit(s) 36 in a manner that mimics the write processpreviously described.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a computing core26 that includes a processing module 50, a memory controller 52, mainmemory 54, a video graphics processing unit 55, an input/output (IO)controller 56, a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) interface 58,at least one IO device interface module 62, a read only memory (ROM)basic input output system (BIOS) 64, and one or more memory interfacemodules. The memory interface module(s) includes one or more of auniversal serial bus (USB) interface module 66, a host bus adapter (HBA)interface module 68, a network interface module 70, a flash interfacemodule 72, a hard drive interface module 74, and a DSN interface module76. Note the DSN interface module 76 and/or the network interface module70 may function as the interface 30 of the user device 14 of FIG. 1.Further note that the IO device interface module 62 and/or the memoryinterface modules may be collectively or individually referred to as IOports.

The processing module 50 may be a single processing device or aplurality of processing devices. Such a processing device may be amicroprocessor, micro-controller, digital signal processor,microcomputer, central processing unit, field programmable gate array,programmable logic device, state machine, logic circuitry, analogcircuitry, digital circuitry, and/or any device that manipulates signals(analog and/or digital) based on hard coding of the circuitry and/oroperational instructions. The processing module 50 may have anassociated memory and/or memory element, which may be a single memorydevice, a plurality of memory devices, and/or embedded circuitry of theprocessing module 50. Such a memory device may be a read-only memory,random access memory, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, staticmemory, dynamic memory, flash memory, cache memory, and/or any devicethat stores digital information. Note that if the processing module 50includes more than one processing device, the processing devices may becentrally located (e.g., directly coupled together via a wired and/orwireless bus structure) or may be distributedly located (e.g., cloudcomputing via indirect coupling via a local area network and/or a widearea network). Further note that when the processing module 50implements one or more of its functions via a state machine, analogcircuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logic circuitry, the memory and/ormemory element storing the corresponding operational instructions may beembedded within, or external to, the circuitry comprising the statemachine, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logic circuitry.Still further note that, the memory element stores, and the processingmodule 50 executes, hard coded and/or operational instructionscorresponding to at least some of the steps and/or functions illustratedin FIGS. 1-12.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a dispersedstorage (DS) processing module 34 of user device 12 and/or of the DSprocessing unit 16. The DS processing module 34 includes a gatewaymodule 78, an access module 80, a grid module 82, and a storage module84. The DS processing module 34 may also include an interface 30 and theDSnet interface 32 or the interfaces 68 and/or 70 may be part of user 12or of the DS processing unit 14. The DS processing module 34 may furtherinclude a bypass/feedback path between the storage module 84 to thegateway module 78. Note that the modules 78-84 of the DS processingmodule 34 may be in a single unit or distributed across multiple units.

In an example of storing data, the gateway module 78 receives anincoming data object that includes a user ID field 86, an object namefield 88, and the data field 40 and may also receive correspondinginformation that includes a process identifier (e.g., an internalprocess/application ID), metadata, a file system directory, a blocknumber, a transaction message, a user device identity (ID), a dataobject identifier, a source name, and/or user information. The gatewaymodule 78 authenticates the user associated with the data object byverifying the user ID 86 with the managing unit 18 and/or anotherauthenticating unit.

When the user is authenticated, the gateway module 78 obtains userinformation from the management unit 18, the user device, and/or theother authenticating unit. The user information includes a vaultidentifier, operational parameters, and user attributes (e.g., userdata, billing information, etc.). A vault identifier identifies a vault,which is a virtual memory space that maps to a set of DS storage units36. For example, vault 1 (i.e., user 1's DSN memory space) includeseight DS storage units (X=8 wide) and vault 2 (i.e., user 2's DSN memoryspace) includes sixteen DS storage units (X=16 wide). The operationalparameters may include an error coding algorithm, the width n (number ofpillars X or slices per segment for this vault), a read threshold T, awrite threshold, an encryption algorithm, a slicing parameter, acompression algorithm, an integrity check method, caching settings,parallelism settings, and/or other parameters that may be used to accessthe DSN memory layer.

The gateway module 78 uses the user information to assign a source name35 to the data. For instance, the gateway module 60 determines thesource name 35 of the data object 40 based on the vault identifier andthe data object. For example, the source name may contain a fileidentifier (ID), a vault generation number, a reserved field, and avault identifier (ID). As another example, the gateway module 78 maygenerate the file ID based on a hash function of the data object 40.Note that the gateway module 78 may also perform message conversion,protocol conversion, electrical conversion, optical conversion, accesscontrol, user identification, user information retrieval, trafficmonitoring, statistics generation, configuration, management, and/orsource name determination.

The access module 80 receives the data object 40 and creates a series ofdata segments 1 through Y 90-92 in accordance with a data storageprotocol (e.g., file storage system, a block storage system, and/or anaggregated block storage system). The number of segments Y may be chosenor randomly assigned based on a selected segment size and the size ofthe data object. For example, if the number of segments is chosen to bea fixed number, then the size of the segments varies as a function ofthe size of the data object. For instance, if the data object is animage file of 4,194,304 eight bit bytes (e.g., 33,554,432 bits) and thenumber of segments Y=131,072, then each segment is 256 bits or 32 bytes.As another example, if segment sized is fixed, then the number ofsegments Y varies based on the size of data object. For instance, if thedata object is an image file of 4,194,304 bytes and the fixed size ofeach segment is 4,096 bytes, the then number of segments Y=1,024. Notethat each segment is associated with the same source name.

The grid module 82 receives the data segments and may manipulate (e.g.,compression, encryption, cyclic redundancy check (CRC), etc.) each ofthe data segments before performing an error coding function of theerror coding dispersal storage function to produce a pre-manipulateddata segment. After manipulating a data segment, if applicable, the gridmodule 82 error encodes (e.g., Reed-Solomon, Convolution encoding,Trellis encoding, etc.) the data segment or manipulated data segmentinto X error coded data slices 42-44.

The value X, or the number of pillars (e.g., X=16), is chosen as aparameter of the error coding dispersal storage function. Otherparameters of the error coding dispersal function include a readthreshold T, a write threshold W, etc. The read threshold (e.g., T=10,when X=16) corresponds to the minimum number of error-free error codeddata slices required to reconstruct the data segment. In other words,the DS processing module 34 can compensate for X-T (e.g., 16-10=6)missing error coded data slices per data segment. The write threshold Wcorresponds to a minimum number of DS storage units that acknowledgeproper storage of their respective data slices before the DS processingmodule indicates proper storage of the encoded data segment. Note thatthe write threshold is greater than or equal to the read threshold for agiven number of pillars (X).

For each data slice of a data segment, the grid module 82 generates aunique slice name 37 and attaches it thereto. The slice name 37 includesa universal routing information field and a vault specific field and maybe 48 bytes (e.g., 24 bytes for each of the universal routinginformation field and the vault specific field). As illustrated, theuniversal routing information field includes a slice index, a vault ID,a vault generation, and a reserved field. The slice index is based onthe pillar number and the vault ID and, as such, is unique for eachpillar (e.g., slices of the same pillar for the same vault for anysegment will share the same slice index). The vault specific fieldincludes a data name, which includes a file ID and a segment number(e.g., a sequential numbering of data segments 1-Y of a simple dataobject or a data block number).

Prior to outputting the error coded data slices of a data segment, thegrid module may perform post-slice manipulation on the slices. Ifenabled, the manipulation includes slice level compression, encryption,CRC, addressing, tagging, and/or other manipulation to improve theeffectiveness of the computing system.

When the error coded data slices of a data segment are ready to beoutputted, the grid module 82 determines which of the DS storage units36 will store the EC data slices based on a dispersed storage memorymapping associated with the user's vault and/or DS storage unitattributes. The DS storage unit attributes may include availability,self-selection, performance history, link speed, link latency,ownership, available DSN memory, domain, cost, a prioritization scheme,a centralized selection message from another source, a lookup table,data ownership, and/or any other factor to optimize the operation of thecomputing system. Note that the number of DS storage units 36 is equalto or greater than the number of pillars (e.g., X) so that no more thanone error coded data slice of the same data segment is stored on thesame DS storage unit 36. Further note that EC data slices of the samepillar number but of different segments (e.g., EC data slice 1 of datasegment 1 and EC data slice 1 of data segment 2) may be stored on thesame or different DS storage units 36.

The storage module 84 performs an integrity check on the outboundencoded data slices and, when successful, identifies a plurality of DSstorage units based on information provided by the grid module 82. Thestorage module 84 then outputs the encoded data slices 1 through X ofeach segment 1 through Y to the DS storage units 36. Each of the DSstorage units 36 stores its EC data slice(s) and maintains a localvirtual DSN address to physical location table to convert the virtualDSN address of the EC data slice(s) into physical storage addresses.

In an example of a read operation, the user device 12 and/or 14 sends aread request to the DS processing unit 14, which authenticates therequest. When the request is authentic, the DS processing unit 14 sendsa read message to each of the DS storage units 36 storing slices of thedata object being read. The slices are received via the DSnet interface32 and processed by the storage module 84, which performs a parity checkand provides the slices to the grid module 82 when the parity check wassuccessful. The grid module 82 decodes the slices in accordance with theerror coding dispersal storage function to reconstruct the data segment.The access module 80 reconstructs the data object from the data segmentsand the gateway module 78 formats the data object for transmission tothe user device.

FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a grid module 82that includes a control unit 73, a pre-slice manipulator 75, an encoder77, a slicer 79, a post-slice manipulator 81, a pre-slice de-manipulator83, a decoder 85, a de-slicer 87, and/or a post-slice de-manipulator 89.Note that the control unit 73 may be partially or completely external tothe grid module 82. For example, the control unit 73 may be part of thecomputing core at a remote location, part of a user device, part of theDS managing unit 18, or distributed amongst one or more DS storageunits.

In an example of write operation, the pre-slice manipulator 75 receivesa data segment 90-92 and a write instruction from an authorized userdevice. The pre-slice manipulator 75 determines if pre-manipulation ofthe data segment 90-92 is required and, if so, what type. The pre-slicemanipulator 75 may make the determination independently or based oninstructions from the control unit 73, where the determination is basedon a computing system-wide predetermination, a table lookup, vaultparameters associated with the user identification, the type of data,security requirements, available DSN memory, performance requirements,and/or other metadata.

Once a positive determination is made, the pre-slice manipulator 75manipulates the data segment 90-92 in accordance with the type ofmanipulation. For example, the type of manipulation may be compression(e.g., Lempel-Ziv-Welch, Huffman, Golomb, fractal, wavelet, etc.),signatures (e.g., Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Elliptic Curve DSA,Secure Hash Algorithm, etc.), watermarking, tagging, encryption (e.g.,Data Encryption Standard, Advanced Encryption Standard, etc.), addingmetadata (e.g., time/date stamping, user information, file type, etc.),cyclic redundancy check (e.g., CRC32), and/or other data manipulationsto produce the pre-manipulated data segment.

The encoder 77 encodes the pre-manipulated data segment 92 using aforward error correction (FEC) encoder (and/or other type of erasurecoding and/or error coding) to produce an encoded data segment 94. Theencoder 77 determines which forward error correction algorithm to usebased on a predetermination associated with the user's vault, a timebased algorithm, user direction, DS managing unit direction, controlunit direction, as a function of the data type, as a function of thedata segment 92 metadata, and/or any other factor to determine algorithmtype. The forward error correction algorithm may be Golay,Multidimensional parity, Reed-Solomon, Hamming, Bose Ray ChauduriHocquenghem (BCH), Cauchy-Reed-Solomon, or any other FEC encoder. Notethat the encoder 77 may use a different encoding algorithm for each datasegment 92, the same encoding algorithm for the data segments 92 of adata object, or a combination thereof.

The encoded data segment 94 is of greater size than the data segment 92by the overhead rate of the encoding algorithm by a factor of X/T, whereX is the width or number of slices, and T is the read threshold. In thisregard, the corresponding decoding process can accommodate at most X-Tmissing EC data slices and still recreate the data segment 92. Forexample, if X=16 and T=10, then the data segment 92 will be recoverableas long as 10 or more EC data slices per segment are not corrupted.

The slicer 79 transforms the encoded data segment 94 into EC data slicesin accordance with the slicing parameter from the vault for this userand/or data segment 92. For example, if the slicing parameter is X=16,then the slicer 79 slices each encoded data segment 94 into 16 encodedslices.

The post-slice manipulator 81 performs, if enabled, post-manipulation onthe encoded slices to produce the EC data slices. If enabled, thepost-slice manipulator 81 determines the type of post-manipulation,which may be based on a computing system-wide predetermination,parameters in the vault for this user, a table lookup, the useridentification, the type of data, security requirements, available DSNmemory, performance requirements, control unit directed, and/or othermetadata. Note that the type of post-slice manipulation may includeslice level compression, signatures, encryption, CRC, addressing,watermarking, tagging, adding metadata, and/or other manipulation toimprove the effectiveness of the computing system.

In an example of a read operation, the post-slice de-manipulator 89receives at least a read threshold number of EC data slices and performsthe inverse function of the post-slice manipulator 81 to produce aplurality of encoded slices. The de-slicer 87 de-slices the encodedslices to produce an encoded data segment 94. The decoder 85 performsthe inverse function of the encoder 77 to recapture the data segment90-92. The pre-slice de-manipulator 83 performs the inverse function ofthe pre-slice manipulator 75 to recapture the data segment 90-92.

FIG. 5 is a diagram of an example of slicing an encoded data segment 94by the slicer 79. In this example, the encoded data segment 94 includesthirty-two bits, but may include more or less bits. The slicer 79disperses the bits of the encoded data segment 94 across the EC dataslices in a pattern as shown. As such, each EC data slice does notinclude consecutive bits of the data segment 94 reducing the impact ofconsecutive bit failures on data recovery. For example, if EC data slice2 (which includes bits 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 25, and 29) is unavailable(e.g., lost, inaccessible, or corrupted), the data segment can bereconstructed from the other EC data slices (e.g., 1, 3 and 4 for a readthreshold of 3 and a width of 4).

FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of an accessinformation storage system that includes a user dispersed storage (DS)managing unit 18, at least one dispersed storage (DS) processing unit 16of a plurality of DS processing units 1-N, and at least one dispersedstorage network (DSN) memory 22 of a plurality of DSN memories 1-N. Forexample, the system may include N DS processing units 1-N and N DSNmemories 1-N. As another example, the system may include one DSprocessing unit and N DSN memories. As yet another example, the systemmay include N DS processing units 1-N and one DSN memory. Each DSprocessing unit 1-N may be implemented utilizing an authenticationserver.

The DS managing unit 18 includes an access information package 102, ashare encoder 104, a plurality of random number generators (RNG) 1-N, aplurality of key generators 1-N, an authentication input processor 106,and a plurality of encryptors 1-N. The access information package 102includes access information 108 and an access information hash digest110. The access information hash digest 110 may be generated byutilizing a hashing function on the access information 108 and may beutilized in a subsequent integrity verification step to verify that theaccess information 108 has not been tampered with.

The access information 108 may include one or more of a user deviceidentifier (ID), a communications path identifier, a wireless channelidentifier, a communications system talk-group identifier, an encryptionkey, a credential, access permissions, authentication information, andaccess privileges. The access information 108 may be subsequentlyutilized by a user device to gain access to a system (e.g., aninformation system, a data storage system, a communication system, acontrol system, etc.). Gaining access may include one or more ofestablishing a connection, receiving content from the system, sendingcontent to the system, deleting content from the system, receiving acommunication, and sending a communication. For example, a firstwireless user device utilizes the access information 108 to gain accessto a plurality of other wireless devices. For instance, the firstwireless user device utilizes access information 108 that includes awireless channel identifier and a broadcast communication encryption keyassociated with the plurality of other wireless devices.

The share encoder 104 encodes the access information package 102 inaccordance with a share encoding function to produce a plurality ofencoded shares 1-N. The share encoding function includes at least one ofa dispersed storage error encoding function and a secret sharingfunction (e.g., a Shamir secret sharing algorithm). The encryptors 1-Nencrypt the encoded shares 1-N in accordance with an encryptionalgorithm utilizing keys 1-N to produce encrypted shares 1-N. Generationof the keys 1-N is discussed in greater detail below. The encryptionalgorithm may be in accordance with dispersed storage error codingparameters. For example, each of the encryptors 1-N utilize a commonencryption algorithm in accordance with the dispersed storage errorcoding parameters. As another example, at least two encryptors of theencryptors 1-N utilize different encryption algorithms in accordancewith the dispersed storage error coding parameters.

The encryptors 1-N output the encrypted shares 1-N to the DS processingunits 1-N. The DS processing units 1-N dispersed storage error encodeseach encrypted share of the encrypted shares 1-N to produce N groups ofencoded share slices in accordance with the error coding dispersalstorage function parameters, wherein each group of encoded share slicesincludes one or more sets of encoded data slices. The DS processingunits 1-N send the N groups of encoded share slices to the DSN memories1-N for storage therein. Alternatively, the functionality of the DSprocessing unit (e.g., DS processing 34) may be included in the DSmanaging unit 18 such that the DS managing unit 18 dispersed storageerror encodes the encrypted shares 1-N to produce the N groups ofencoded share slices. The DS managing unit 18 sends the N groups ofencoded share slices to the DSN memories 1-N for storage therein.Alternatively, the encryptors 1-N output the encrypted shares 1-N to oneor more of the DSN memories 1-N for storage therein (e.g., withoutproducing N groups of encoded share slices). Alternatively, the DSprocessing units 1-N send the encrypted shares 1-N to the one or more ofthe DSN memories 1-N for storage therein.

The authentication input processor 106 generates a plurality of hiddenpasswords p1-pN based on a set of personalized authenticating values1-A. The personalized authenticating values 1-A includes one or more ofat least one of a user device identifier (ID), a user ID, a personalinformation number (PIN), a badge ID, a district ID, a work-shift ID, anassignment ID, a mission ID, a passcode, a password, a picture file, avideo file, an audio file, a retinal scan, a facial scan, a fingerprintscan, a personal secret, a password index number, and any other valuesthat can be subsequently provided by a user of a user device. Thegenerating of the plurality of hidden passwords p1-pN includestransforming the set of personalized authenticating values 1-A inaccordance with a set of transformation functions to produce a set oftransformed personalized authenticating values and for each password ofthe corresponding plurality of hidden passwords, combining, inaccordance with a combining function, one of the set of transformedpersonalized authenticating values with at least one of a constant andanother one of the set of transformed personalized authenticating valuesto produce the password. In an instance, each hidden password is uniquefrom all the other hidden passwords. In another instance, each hiddenpassword is substantially the same as all the other hidden passwords.

For example, the authentication input processor 106 obtains apersonalized authenticating value 1 from a fingerprint reader output andcalculates a hash to produce a first intermediate result. Next, theauthentication input processor 106 obtains a personalized authenticatingvalue 2 as a PIN and adds the PIN to the first intermediate result toproduce a hidden password core. The authentication input processor 106partitions the hidden password core to produce the hidden passwordsp1-pN. Alternatively, the authentication input processor 106 replicatesthe hidden password core to produce the hidden passwords p1-pN.

The random number generators 1-N generate a plurality of random numberse₁-e_(N). For example, random numbers e₁-e_(N) are each a same number ofbits as a number of bits of p, where p is determined by securityparameters (e.g., of the dispersed storage error coding parameters).

The random number generators 1-N output the plurality of random numberse₁-e_(N) to the DS processing units 1-N. The DS processing units 1-Ndispersed storage error encodes each random number of the plurality ofrandom numbers in accordance with the dispersed storage error codingparameters to produce N groups of encoded random number slices, whereineach group of encoded random number slices includes at least one set ofrandom number slices. Next, the DS processing units 1 send the groups ofencoded random number slices to the DSN memories 1-N for storagetherein. Alternatively, the DS managing unit 18 dispersed storage errorencodes the plurality of random numbers to produce the N groups ofencoded random number slices. Next, the DS managing unit 18 sends the Ngroups of encoded random number slices to the DSN memories 1-N forstorage therein. Alternatively, the DS managing 18 sends the pluralityof random numbers e₁-e_(N) to the one or more of the DSN memories 1-Nfor storage therein.

The key generators 1-N generate the keys 1-N based on one or more of theplurality of random numbers e₁-e_(N) , the security parameters, and thehidden passwords p1-pN. Each key of the keys 1-N includes a same numberof bits as a number of bits of p. For example, the key generators 1-Ngenerate the keys 1-N by transforming an expansion of the hiddenpassword p1-pN utilizing a mask generating function (MGF) and the randomnumber e₁-e_(N) in accordance with the expression: keyx=((MGF(px))²)^(e) _(x) modulo p. For example, key 1=((MGF(p1))²)^(e) ₁modulo p. In an instance, the generator 1 calculates key 1=13 whenMGF(p1)=4, e₁=10, and p=23,since (4²)¹⁰ mod 23=13. Alternatively, or inaddition to, the key may be further processed to provide a key of adesired length in relation to an encryption algorithm. For example, thekey output of the algorithm is hashed to produce a hashed key and adesired number of bits (e.g., 256, 192, 128 bits) of the hashed key areutilized as a key for the encryption algorithm. The method of operationof the DS managing unit 18 to store the access information package 102is discussed in greater detail with reference to FIGS. 7-8.

Note that the one or more hidden passwords p1-pN and a decode thresholdnumber of pairs of random numbers e_(x) and encrypted shares x arerequired to reverse the process to decode a threshold number of sharesto reproduce the access information package 102. The method to reproducethe access information package 102 is discussed in greater detail withreference to FIGS. 9-12. Note that a security improvement is provided bythe system when the pairs of random numbers e_(x) and encrypted shares xare stored on substantially different authentication servers and/or viatwo or more DS processing units and two or more DSN memories by reducingthe likelihood of a successful attack to gain access to the pairs ofrandom numbers e_(x) and encrypted shares x.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating an example of storing accessinformation. The method begins with step 116 where a processing module(e.g., of a dispersed storage (DS) managing unit) determines securityparameters to be utilized in storing an access information package ofdata. The security parameters may include one or more of a share numberN, a value of security algorithm constant p (a prime number), a value ofsecurity algorithm constant q (a prime number), one or more sharedsecret algorithm parameters, an encryption algorithm indicator, a keygenerator function indicator, a key size, a random number generatorfunction, a random number size, a hash function type indicator, asecurity package structure indicator, and any other parameter to specifythe operation of the storing of the access information package data. Thedetermination may be based on one or more of security requirements, asecurity status indicator, a user identifier (ID), a vault ID, a list, atable lookup, a predetermination, a message, and a command. For example,the processing module determines the security parameters based on atable lookup corresponding to a user ID affiliated with a user deviceassociated with the access information package data.

The method continues at step 118 where the processing module generatesthe access information package data. For example, the processing modulecalculates a hash digest of a group broadcast encryption key and bundlesthe hash digest with the key to create the access information packagedata. The method continues at step 120 where the processing moduleapplies a share encoding function on the data to produce a plurality ofencoded shares 1-N. The share encoding function includes at least one ofa dispersed storage error encoding function and a secret sharingfunction (e.g., Shamir's secret sharing scheme, Blakley's scheme,Chinese Remainder Theorem scheme). For example, the processing modulecreates shares 1-16 in accordance with shared secret algorithmparameters when the share encoding function is the secret sharingfunction and N=16. As another example, the processing module dispersedstorage error encodes the access information package data in accordancewith an error coding dispersal storage function to produce shares 1-16as encoded data slices when the share encoding function is the dispersedstorage error encoding function and a pillar width is 16.

The method continues at step 122 where the processing module generates aplurality of random numbers. The generating includes obtaining aplurality of base random numbers and expanding each base random numberof the plurality of base random numbers based on the security parametersto produce the plurality of random numbers. For example, the processingmodule produces a random number e_(x) utilizing a random numbergenerator function such that the bit length of the random number e_(x)is substantially the same as a bit length of a value of securityalgorithm constant p and/or a bit length of a value of securityalgorithm constant q. For instance, the processing module produces arandom number e₃ that is 1,024 bits in length when the securityalgorithm constant p is 1,024 bits in length.

The method continues at step 124 where the processing module obtains aset of personalized authenticating values regarding user access to thedata. The set of personalized authenticating values includes at leastone of a user device identifier (ID), a user ID, a personal informationnumber (PIN), a badge ID, a district ID, a work-shift ID, an assignmentID, a mission ID, a passcode, a password, a picture file, a video file,an audio file, a retinal scan, a facial scan, a fingerprint scan, apersonal secret, and a password index number. The obtaining may be basedon one or more of a user device query, registration information, alookup, a user device input, a DS managing unit input, a DS managingunit lookup, a message, and a command. For example, the processingmodule obtains a PIN personalized authenticating value via a query to anassociated user device. As another example, the processing moduleperforms a badge ID table lookup to obtain a badge ID personalizedauthenticating value.

The method continues at step 126 where the processing module generates aplurality of hidden passwords based on the set of personalizedauthenticating values. The generating includes transforming the set ofpersonalized authenticating values in accordance with a set oftransformation functions to produce a set of transformed personalizedauthenticating values and for each hidden password of the correspondingplurality of hidden passwords, combining, in accordance with a combiningfunction, one of the set of transformed personalized authenticatingvalues with at least one of a constant and another one of the set oftransformed personalized authenticating values to produce anintermediate password. The intermediate password may be transformedutilizing a transformation function to produce the hidden password. Thetransformation function includes at least one of a null function, aconcatenation function, an inverting function, a hashing function, anencryption function, a compressing function, and a mask generatingfunction. The combining function includes at least one of an additionfunction, a subtraction function, a multiplication function, a divisionfunction, a logical exclusive OR function, a logical OR function, and alogical AND function.

For example, the processing module performs a hashing function on a PINpersonalized authenticating value to produce a first transformedpersonalized authenticating value and performs an inverting function ona badge ID to produce a second transformed personalized authenticatingvalue. Next the processing module performs a logical exclusive OR as thecombining function on the first and second transformed personalizedauthenticating values to produce a first hidden password of theplurality of hidden passwords.

The method continues at step 128 where the processing module generatesan encryption key based on a corresponding one of the plurality ofhidden passwords and a corresponding one of the plurality of randomnumbers. The generating includes transforming the corresponding one ofthe plurality of hidden passwords utilizing a mask generating function(MGF), security parameters, and the corresponding one of the pluralityof random numbers. For example, the processing module generates a key xbased on hidden password px and corresponding random number e_(x) inaccordance with the expression key x=((MGF(px))²)^(e) _(x) modulo p aspreviously discussed with reference to FIG. 6.

The method continues at step 130 where the processing module encrypts anencoded share x utilizing an encryption key x in accordance with anencryption algorithm to produce an encrypted share x. The encryptionunder the may be based on one or more of the security parameters, thedispersed storage error coding parameters, a user identifier (ID), avault ID, a vault lookup, security requirements, a security statusindicator, a message, and a command.

The method continues at step 132 where the processing module determineswhether all N encoded shares have been encrypted. The determination maybe based on comparing a number of encrypted shares produced so far to avalue of N. The method repeats back to step 128 when the processingmodule determines that all N encrypted shares have not been produced.The method continues to step 134 when the processing module determinesthat all N encrypted shares have been produced.

The method continues at step 134 where the processing modulefacilitating storage of the plurality of random numbers and each of theencrypted shares. The facilitating includes at least one of sending theencrypted share and the corresponding one of the corresponding pluralityof random numbers to a dispersed storage (DS) processing unit, dispersedstorage error encoding the encrypted share to produce a plurality ofencoded share slices and outputting the plurality of encoded shareslices for storage, and dispersed storage error encoding thecorresponding one of the corresponding plurality of random numbers toproduce a plurality of encoded random number slices and outputting theplurality of encoded random number slices for storage. For example, theDS processing module encodes the encrypted share x and the random numbere_(x) in accordance with an error coding dispersal storage function toproduce encoded data slices for storage in memories. The processingmodule may facilitate the storage of each pair of encrypted share x andrandom number e_(x) such that at least two or more of the pairs arestored in different memories (e.g., different DS units, different DSNmemories, different authentication servers, at different geographiclocations, etc.) to provide a system security improvement.

FIG. 8 is another flowchart illustrating another example of storingaccess information, which includes similar steps to FIG. 7. The methodbegins with steps 116-132 of FIG. 7 where a processing module (e.g., ofa dispersed storage (DS) managing unit) determines security parameters,generates an access information package (e.g., data), applies a shareencoding function on the data to produce a plurality of encoded shares,generates a plurality of random numbers, obtains a set of personalizedauthenticating values, generates a plurality of hidden passwords basedon the set of personalized authenticating values, generates anencryption key based on a corresponding one of the plurality of hiddenpasswords and a corresponding one of the random numbers, encrypts anencoded share utilizing the encryption key to produce an encryptedshare, and determines whether all encoded shares have been encrypted.The method repeats back to step 128 of FIG. 7 when the processing moduledetermines that all encrypted shares have not been produced. The methodcontinues to step 136 when the processing module determines that allencrypted shares have been produced.

The method continues at step 136 where the processing module determinesavailable user devices for storage of the encrypted shares and theplurality of random numbers. The determination may be based on one ormore of detecting wireless user devices within range of a target userdevice, a user device query, a user device response, a list ofaffiliated user devices, and a command. For example, the processingmodule determines available user devices by sending a plurality ofavailability requests to a plurality of wireless devices that areaffiliated (e.g., part of the same group) with the target user device.Next, the processing module receives a plurality of availabilityresponses from the plurality of wireless devices.

The method continues at step 138 where the processing module selectsuser devices from the available user devices. The selection may be basedon one or more of a number of encrypted shares to be stored (e.g., avalue of N), the available user devices, a proximity indicator for eachuser device, selecting user devices that are the closest to the targetuser device (e.g., based on a response to a query), user devices thathave a favorable performance history, user devices that have a favorableavailability history, a user device query, a user device response, thelist of affiliated user devices, and a command. For example, theprocessing module selects user devices 5, 11, 40, 2, 44, and 20 when N=6and each of the selected user devices has favorable availability andperformance histories.

The method continues at step 140 where the processing module outputs theplurality of random numbers and each of the encrypted shares to theselected user devices for storage therein. For example, the processingmodule encodes encrypted share 2 and the random number e₂ in accordancewith an error coding dispersal storage function to produce encoded dataslices for storage in user device 2. Note that the processing module mayfacilitate storage of each pair of encrypted share x and random numbere_(x) such that at least two or more of the pairs are stored indifferent user devices to provide a system security improvement.

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of an accessinformation retrieval system that includes a user device 12, a pluralityof dispersed storage (DS) processing modules 1-N, and a plurality ofmemories 1-N. Each DS processing module 1-N may be implemented utilizingone or more of a DS processing unit 16 of FIG. 1, a web server, a DSunit, and an authentication server. The plurality of memories 1-N may beimplemented utilizing at least one of one or more memory devices, one ormore DS units, and one or more dispersed storage network (DSN) memories.For example, memory 1 is implemented as a first DS unit and memory 2 isimplemented as a second DS unit. As another example, memory 1 isimplemented as a first plurality of DS units and memory 2 is implementedas a second plurality of DS units, wherein the first and secondplurality of DS units may or may not be the same DS units. As yetanother example, DS processing module 1 and memory 1 are implemented asa first DS unit and DS processing module 2 and memory 2 are implementedas a second DS unit. Alternatively, the system may be implementedutilizing one DS processing module and N memories 1-N. As anotheralternative, the system may be implemented utilizing N DS processingmodules and N dispersed storage network (DSN) memories. As yet anotheralternative an authentication server may substitute for each DSprocessing module 1-N and memory 1-N.

The DS processing modules 1-N includes DS processing 1-N and passkeygenerators 1-N. Alternatively, the user device 12 includes functionalityof the DS processing units 1-N. The user device includes an accessinformation package 102, a share decoder 142, an authentication inputprocessor 106, a plurality of random number generators (RNG) 1-N, aplurality of blinded password generators 1-N (e.g., b-pass gen 1-N), aplurality of value generators (e.g., v gen 1-N), a plurality of keyregenerators (e.g., key regen 1-N), and a plurality of decryptors 1-N.The access information package 102 includes access information 108 andan access information digest 110.

The authentication input processor 106 generates a plurality of hiddenpasswords p1-pN based on a set of personalized authenticating values1-A. For example, the authentication input processor 106 obtains a badgeidentifier (ID) as a personalized authenticating value 1 based on a userinput and calculates a hash of the value to produce a first intermediateresult. Next, the authentication input processor 106 obtains atalk-group ID as a personalized authenticating value 2 and adds thesecond value to the first intermediate result to produce a hiddenpassword core. The authentication input processor 106 partitions thehidden password core to produce the hidden passwords p1-pN.Alternatively, the authentication input processor 106 replicates thehidden password core to produce the hidden passwords p1-pN.

The random number generators 1-N generate blinded random numbersb₁-b_(N). For example, each random number generator of the random numbergenerators 1-N generates a blinded random number of the blinded randomnumbers b₁-b_(N) such that each blinded random number includes a samenumber of bits as a number of bits of p, wherein p is extracted fromdispersed storage error coding parameters and/or security parameters.The random number generators 1-N send the blinded random numbersb₁-b_(N) to the blinded password generators 1-N and to the valuegenerators 1-N.

The blinded password generators 1-N generate blinded passwords (bpass)1-N based on security parameters, the blinded random numbers b₁-b_(N),and the hidden passwords p1-pN. The blinded passwords 1-N are generatedsuch that each blinded random number includes a same number of bits as anumber of bits of security perimeter p. For example, the blindedpassword generators 1-N generate the bpass 1-N values by transforming anexpansion of the hidden password p1-pN into the same number of bits asthe security parameter constant p utilizing a mask generating function(MGF) and one of the blinded random numbers b₁-b_(N) in accordance withthe expression bpass x=((MGF(px))²)^(b) _(x) modulo p. For example,bpass 1=((MGF(p1))²)^(b) ₁ modulo p. In an instance, the blindedpassword generator 1 calculates bpass 1=18 when MGF(p1)=4,b₁=7, andp=23, since (4²)⁷ mod 23=18. The blinded password generators 1-N sendthe bpass 1-N values to the passkey generators 1-N to retrieve passkeys1-N as described below.

The value generators 1-N generate values v₁-v_(N) based on the blindedrandom numbers b₁-b_(N) and the value of a security parameters constantq in accordance with an expression b*v modulo q=1. The value of q isbased on a value of p in accordance with the expression q=(p−1)/2. Forexample, q=11 when p=23. For instance, value generator 1 generates avalue v1=8 when b₁=7 and q=11 since 7*8=56 and 56 modulo 11=1. The valuegenerators 1-N send the values v₁ through v_(N) to the key regenerators1-N.

The passkey generators 1-N retrieve previously stored random numbervalues e₁ through e_(N) from DS processing 1-N to produce recoveredrandom numbers e₁ through e_(N) in response to receiving a retrieveaccess information package request from the user device 12.Alternatively, the user device 12 directly retrieves stored randomnumber values e₁ through e_(N). For example, DS processing 1-N retrievesthe least a decode threshold number of stored random number slices ofslices 1-N to produce a set of recovered random numbers. The passkeygenerators 1-N generate passkey 1-N based on recovered random numbers e₁through e_(N) and the values of bpass 1-N received from the blindedpassword generators 1-N in accordance with the expression passkeyx=(bpass x)^(e) _(x) modulo p. For example, passkey generator 1generates a passkey 1=9 when bpass 1=18, e₁=10,and p=23 since (18)¹⁰modulo 23=9.

The key regenerators 1-N receive the passkey 1-N values from the passkeygenerators 1-N and regenerates keys 1-N based on the passkeys 1-N andthe values v₁ through v_(N) in accordance with an expression keyx=(passkey x)^(v) _(x) modulo p. For example, key regenerator 1regenerates key 1 such that key 1=13 when passkey 1=9, v1=8, and p=23since (9)⁸ modulo 23=13. The key regenerators 1-N send keys 1-N to thedecryptors 1-N.

The DS processing 1-N retrieve, de-slice, and decodes at least a decodethreshold number of encrypted share slices of slices 1-N utilizing anerror coding dispersal storage function to produce a set of encryptedshares 1-N from one or more of the memories 1-N in response to an accessinformation package retrieval request received from the user device 12.The decryptors 1-N receive the set of encrypted shares 1-N from the DSprocessing 1-N. The decryptors 1-N decrypt the encrypted shares 1-Nutilizing keys 1-N in accordance with a decryption algorithm to produceshares 1-N. Alternatively, the decryptors 1-N decrypt the encryptedshares 1-N to produce encoded data slices as the shares 1-N. Thedecryption algorithm may be in accordance with operational parametersand/or the security parameters of the user device 12. For example, eachof the decryptors 1-N utilizes substantially the same decryptionalgorithm in accordance with the operational parameters and/or securityparameters. Alternatively, at least two of the decryptors 1-N utilize adifferent decryption algorithm in accordance with the operationalparameters and/or the security parameters. The decryptors 1-N send theshares 1-N to the share decoder 142.

The share decoder 142 decodes at least a decode threshold number ofshares 1-N to reproduce the access information package 102 (e.g., data).The decoding may include at least one of dispersed storage errordecoding the shares 1-N to reproduce the data and decoding the shares1-N utilizing a secret sharing function to reproduce the data. Forexample, the share decoder 142 decodes the set of shares utilizing aShamir secret sharing algorithm. As another example, the share decoder142 decodes at least the decode threshold number of shares 1-N (e.g.,encoded data slices) in accordance with an error coding dispersalstorage function to produce the access information package 102. Themethod to retrieve securely stored access information package 102 isdiscussed in greater detail with reference to FIGS. 10-12.

FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating an example of retrieving accessinformation, which includes similar steps to FIG. 7. The method beginswith step 116 of FIG. 7 where a processing module (e.g., of a userdevice) determines security parameters. The method continues at step 144where the processing module decodes at least a decode threshold numberof stored random number slices to produce a set of recovered randomnumbers. For example, the processing module retrieves the at least thedecode threshold number of stored random number slices and dispersedstorage error decodes the at least the decode threshold number of storedrandom number slices to produce the set of recovered random numbers.Alternatively, the processing module sends at least one of a randomnumber retrieval request and an access information package retrievalrequest to at least one dispersed storage (DS) processing module. Insuch an alternative, the DS processing module retrieves the at least thedecode threshold number of stored random number slices and dispersedstorage error decodes the at least the decode threshold number of storedrandom number slices to produce the set of recovered random numbers.

The method continues at step 146 where the processing module decodes atleast a decode threshold number of encrypted share slices to produce aset of encrypted shares. For example, the processing module retrievesthe at least the decode threshold number of encrypted share slices anddispersed storage error decodes the at least the decode threshold numberof encrypted share slices to produce the set of encrypted sharesAlternatively, the processing module sends at least one of an encryptedshare retrieval request and the access information package retrievalrequest to at least one dispersed storage (DS) processing module. Insuch an alternative, the DS processing module retrieves the at least thedecode threshold number of encrypted share slices, dispersed storageerror decodes the at least the decode threshold number of encryptedshare slices to produce the set of encrypted shares, and sends the setof encrypted shares to the processing module (e.g., of the user device).

The method continues with step 124 of FIG. 7 where the processing moduleobtains a set of personalized authenticating values regarding useraccess to data. For example, the processing module obtains a personalidentification number (PIN) personalized authenticating value via a userinput to the user device. As another example, the processing moduleperforms a badge identifier (ID) table lookup to obtain a badge IDpersonalized authenticating value. The method continues with step 126 ofFIG. 7 where the processing module generates a set of hidden passwordsbased on the set of personalized authenticating values.

The method continues at step 148 where the processing module generates aset of blinded passwords based on the set of hidden passwords and a setof blinded random numbers. The generating includes for each blindedrandom number of the set of blinded random numbers, transforming acorresponding password of the set of hidden passwords utilizing a maskgenerating function and the blinded random number to produce a blindedpassword of the set of blinded passwords. For example, the processingmodule generates a blinded password x based on a hidden password px anda corresponding blinded random number b_(x) in accordance with anexpression blinded password x=((MGF(px))²)^(b) _(x) modulo p. Theprocessing module generates the set of blinded random numbers byobtaining a set of base random numbers and expanding each base randomnumber of the set of base random numbers based on security parameters toproduce the set of blinded random numbers. For example, the processingmodule produces a blinded random number b_(x) utilizing a random numbergenerator function such that a bit length of the blinded random numberb_(x) is substantially the same as a bit length of one of a value of asecurity algorithm constant p and a bit length of a value of a securityalgorithm constant q. For instance, the processing module produces ablinded random number b₃ that is 1,024 bits in length when the securityalgorithm constant p is 1,024 bits in length.

The method continues at step 150 where the processing module generates aset of passkeys based on the set of blinded passwords and the set ofrecovered random numbers. The generating the set of passkeys includes atleast one of for each blinded password of the set of blinded passwords,transforming the blinded password utilizing a modulo function based on acorresponding recovered random number of the set of recovered randomnumbers and security parameters to produce a passkey of the set ofpasskeys and utilizing the set of blinded passwords to access the set ofpasskeys. Such utilizing of the blinded passwords to access the set ofpasskeys includes sending the access information retrieval request tothe one or more DS processing modules, wherein the request includes theset of blinded passwords, and receiving the set of passkeys. Suchtransforming of the blinded password utilizing a modulo function basedon a corresponding recovered random number of the set of recoveredrandom numbers and security parameters to produce a passkey includes isdiscussed in greater detail with reference to FIG. 12.

The method continues at step 152 where the processing module generates aset of decryption keys based on the set of blinded random numbers andthe set of passkeys. The generating the set of decryption keys includesgenerating a set of values based on the set of blinded random numbersand generating the set of decryption keys based on the set of values andthe set of passkeys. The generating the set of values includestransforming the blinded random number utilizing a modulo function basedon security parameters to produce a value of the set of values for eachblinded random number of the set of blinded random numbers. Thegenerating the set of decryption keys based on the set of values and theset of passkeys includes transforming the passkey utilizing a modulofunction based on security parameters and a corresponding value of theset of values to produce a decryption key of the set of decryption keysfor each passkey of the set of passkeys. For example, the processingmodule generates a value v_(x) of the set of values based on a blindedrandom number b_(x) in accordance with the expression b*v modulo q=1,wherein q is a security constant of security parameters such thatq=(p−1)/2. For instance, v=b̂(q−2) mod q, when q is prime (e.g., 8=7̂9 mod11, 8*7 mod 11=1). The processing module generates a decryption key xbased on a value v_(x) and passkey x in accordance with an expressiondecryption key x=(passkey x)^(v) _(x) modulo p.

The method continues at step 154 were the processing module decrypts theset of encrypted shares utilizing the set of decryption keys to producea set of shares. The decryption is in accordance with a decryptionalgorithm and may be based on one or more of the security parameters,error coding dispersal storage function parameters, a user ID, a vaultID, a vault lookup, security requirements, a security status indicator,a message, and a command. The method continues at step 156 where theprocessing module decodes the set of shares to reproduce the data. Suchdecoding includes at least one of dispersed storage error decoding theset of shares to produce the data and decoding the set of sharesutilizing a secret sharing function to produce the data.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of retrieving andutilizing access information, which includes similar steps to FIG. 10.The method begins with step 116 of FIG. 7 where a processing module(e.g., of a user device) determines security parameters and continueswith steps 144-146 of FIG. 10 where the processing module decodes storedrandom number slices to produce a set of recovered random numbers anddecodes encrypted shared slices to produce a set of encrypted shares.The method continues with steps 124-126 of FIG. 7 where the processingmodule obtains a set of personalized authenticating values and generatesa set of hidden passwords based on the set of personalizedauthenticating values. The method continues with steps 148-156 of FIG.10 where the processing module generates a set of blinded passwordsbased on the set of hidden passwords and a set of blinded randomnumbers, generates a set of passkeys based on a set of blinded passwordsand the set of recovered random numbers, generates a set of decryptionkeys based on the set of blinded random numbers and the set of passkeys,decrypts the set of encrypted shares utilizing the set of decryptionkeys to produce a set of shares, and decodes the set of shares toreproduce the data.

The method continues at step 158 where the processing module validatesthe data when the data is an access information package. Such validatingincludes comparing a calculated hash of access information of the accessinformation package to an access information hash digest of the accessinformation package. For example, the processing module determines thatthe access information package is valid when the comparison indicatesthat the calculated hash of the access information is substantially thesame as the access information hash digest.

The method continues at step 160 where the processing module accesses acomputing network utilizing the data. For example, the processing modulegenerates a wireless network access request utilizing a group broadcastencryption key and a channel identifier of the data to access wirelesscommunications of a group of wireless user devices affiliated with theprocessing module. As another example, the processing module generates awireless talk-group transmission request utilizing a talk-groupidentifier from the data, wherein the talk-group is associated with thegroup of wireless user devices affiliated with processing module. Next,the processing module outputs the wireless access request. For example,the processing module outputs the wireless access request to a wirelesssystem infrastructure. As another example, the processing module outputsthe wireless access request to one or more other wireless user devices.

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating an example of generating a passkeyin accordance with the invention. The method begins with step 162 wherethe processing module (e.g., of a dispersed storage (DS) module)receives at least one of a passkey×retrieval request and an accessinformation retrieval request, wherein the request includes at least oneof, a user identifier (ID), a vault ID, a source name, one or more slicenames, a random number identifier (e.g., a data object name, a blocknumber, a source name, a directory identifier, etc.), and one or moreblinded passwords of a set of blinded passwords. For example, theprocessing module receives a passkey x request from a user device,wherein the request includes a blinded password x and a data object nameaffiliated with an associated stored random number e_(x).

The method continues at step 164 where the processing module obtains oneor more recovered random numbers of a set of recovered random numbers.The obtaining includes retrieving at least a decode threshold number ofstored random number slices and decoding the decode threshold number ofstored random number slices to produce a set of recovered randomnumbers. The retrieving includes at least one of outputting at least onestored random number slices retrieval request message to at least one ofa dispersed storage (DS) processing and a DS unit to retrieve the atleast the decode threshold number of stored random number slices from atleast one dispersed storage network (DSN) memory and receiving the setof stored random number slices.

The method continues at step 166 where the processing module generates aset of passkeys based on the set of blinded passwords and the set ofrecovered random numbers. Such generation includes transforming theblinded password utilizing a modulo function based on a correspondingrecovered random number of the set of recovered random numbers andsecurity parameters to produce a passkey of the set of passkeys for eachblinded password of the set of blinded passwords. For example, theprocessing module generates a passkey x based on a recovered randomnumber e_(x) and blinded password x in accordance with an expressionpasskey x=(blinded password x)^(e) _(x) modulo p. The method continuesat step 168 where the processing module outputs the passkey x (e.g., toa requesting entity such as a user device).

The methods described above operate in accordance with mathematicalexpressions enabling generation of keys utilized to encrypt and decryptshares of an access information package of data. The mathematicalexpressions may be further understood in consideration of the followingmathematical proof, wherein the proof illustrates that a reproduced key(e.g., to decrypt an encrypted share) is substantially equivalent to anoriginal key (e.g., utilized to encrypt the share to produce theencrypted share).

Proof-Recall that:

b*v=1 mod q and p=2*q+1This proof will illustrate that:(MGF(password)̂2)̂(b*e*v) equals (MGF(password)̂2)̂e (modulo p)First, replace MGF(password) with X:(X̂2)̂(b*e*v)=(X̂2)̂(e) (modulo p)Note that:Since b*v=1 mod q, it follows that: b*v=n*q+1, for some integer n. Notethat (b*v)/q=n remainder 1.Therefore (b*v) can be substituted with (n*q+1) in the above expressionyielding:(X̂2)̂((n*q+1)*e) mod pSince p=2*q+1, taking p out of the formula, resulting in:(X̂2)̂((n*q+1)*e) mod (2*q+1)Since X̂2 is raised to a power, simply take X to the power of twice theexponent:X̂(2*(nq+1)*e) mod (2q+1)Which may be written as:X̂((2nq+2)*e) mod (2q+1)Multiplying both parts by e:X̂(2nqe+2e) mod (2q+1)Split these out as so:X̂(2neq)*X̂(2e) mod (2q+1)Re-write the first power of X:X̂(2q*ne)*X̂(2e) mod (2q+1)Which can also be written as:(X̂(2q))̂(ne)*X̂(2e) mod (2q+1)Un-doing the substitution of p for 2q+1, find:(X̂(p−1))̂(ne)*X̂(2e) mod pFermat's Little Theorem shows that for any prime number P, and anyinteger X, that:X̂(P−1)=1 mod P, therefore (X̂(p-1)) mod p=1 mod p. This yields:1̂(ne)*X̂(2e) mod pWhich is the same as:1*X̂(2e) mod pWhich is the same as the key:(X̂2)̂e mod p

As a numerical example:

p=23q=(p−1)/2=11let e1=10let [mask generating function (common password)]̂2=16key 1=16̂e1 mod 23=13let b1=7bpass 1=16̂7 mod 23=18passkey 1=bpasŝe1 mod p=18̂10 mod 23=9b*v=1 modulo qb1*v1=1 mod q7*v1=1 mod 11 note: 56 mod 11=1 so v1=8regen key 1=passkey1̂v1 modulo p9̂8 mod 23=13, which checks with the 13 calculated above for key 1 (i.e.,the key).

As may be used herein, the terms “substantially” and “approximately”provides an industry-accepted tolerance for its corresponding termand/or relativity between items. Such an industry-accepted toleranceranges from less than one percent to fifty percent and corresponds to,but is not limited to, component values, integrated circuit processvariations, temperature variations, rise and fall times, and/or thermalnoise. Such relativity between items ranges from a difference of a fewpercent to magnitude differences. As may also be used herein, theterm(s) “operably coupled to”, “coupled to”, and/or “coupling” includesdirect coupling between items and/or indirect coupling between items viaan intervening item (e.g., an item includes, but is not limited to, acomponent, an element, a circuit, and/or a module) where, for indirectcoupling, the intervening item does not modify the information of asignal but may adjust its current level, voltage level, and/or powerlevel. As may further be used herein, inferred coupling (i.e., where oneelement is coupled to another element by inference) includes direct andindirect coupling between two items in the same manner as “coupled to”.As may even further be used herein, the term “operable to” or “operablycoupled to” indicates that an item includes one or more of powerconnections, input(s), output(s), etc., to perform, when activated, oneor more its corresponding functions and may further include inferredcoupling to one or more other items. As may still further be usedherein, the term “associated with”, includes direct and/or indirectcoupling of separate items and/or one item being embedded within anotheritem. As may be used herein, the term “compares favorably”, indicatesthat a comparison between two or more items, signals, etc., provides adesired relationship. For example, when the desired relationship is thatsignal 1 has a greater magnitude than signal 2, a favorable comparisonmay be achieved when the magnitude of signal 1 is greater than that ofsignal 2 or when the magnitude of signal 2 is less than that of signal1.

As may also be used herein, the terms “processing module”, “module”,“processing circuit”, and/or “processing unit” may be a singleprocessing device or a plurality of processing devices. Such aprocessing device may be a microprocessor, micro-controller, digitalsignal processor, microcomputer, central processing unit, fieldprogrammable gate array, programmable logic device, state machine, logiccircuitry, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or any device thatmanipulates signals (analog and/or digital) based on hard coding of thecircuitry and/or operational instructions. The processing module,module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit may have anassociated memory and/or an integrated memory element, which may be asingle memory device, a plurality of memory devices, and/or embeddedcircuitry of the processing module, module, processing circuit, and/orprocessing unit. Such a memory device may be a read-only memory, randomaccess memory, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, static memory,dynamic memory, flash memory, cache memory, and/or any device thatstores digital information. Note that if the processing module, module,processing circuit, and/or processing unit includes more than oneprocessing device, the processing devices may be centrally located(e.g., directly coupled together via a wired and/or wireless busstructure) or may be distributedly located (e.g., cloud computing viaindirect coupling via a local area network and/or a wide area network).Further note that if the processing module, module, processing circuit,and/or processing unit implements one or more of its functions via astate machine, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logiccircuitry, the memory and/or memory element storing the correspondingoperational instructions may be embedded within, or external to, thecircuitry comprising the state machine, analog circuitry, digitalcircuitry, and/or logic circuitry. Still further note that, the memoryelement may store, and the processing module, module, processingcircuit, and/or processing unit executes, hard coded and/or operationalinstructions corresponding to at least some of the steps and/orfunctions illustrated in one or more of the Figures. Such a memorydevice or memory element can be included in an article of manufacture.

The present invention has been described above with the aid of methodsteps illustrating the performance of specified functions andrelationships thereof. The boundaries and sequence of these functionalbuilding blocks and method steps have been arbitrarily defined hereinfor convenience of description. Alternate boundaries and sequences canbe defined so long as the specified functions and relationships areappropriately performed. Any such alternate boundaries or sequences arethus within the scope and spirit of the claimed invention. Further, theboundaries of these functional building blocks have been arbitrarilydefined for convenience of description. Alternate boundaries could bedefined as long as the certain significant functions are appropriatelyperformed. Similarly, flow diagram blocks may also have been arbitrarilydefined herein to illustrate certain significant functionality. To theextent used, the flow diagram block boundaries and sequence could havebeen defined otherwise and still perform the certain significantfunctionality. Such alternate definitions of both functional buildingblocks and flow diagram blocks and sequences are thus within the scopeand spirit of the claimed invention. One of average skill in the artwill also recognize that the functional building blocks, and otherillustrative blocks, modules and components herein, can be implementedas illustrated or by discrete components, application specificintegrated circuits, processors executing appropriate software and thelike or any combination thereof.

The present invention may have also been described, at least in part, interms of one or more embodiments. An embodiment of the present inventionis used herein to illustrate the present invention, an aspect thereof, afeature thereof, a concept thereof, and/or an example thereof. Aphysical embodiment of an apparatus, an article of manufacture, amachine, and/or of a process that embodies the present invention mayinclude one or more of the aspects, features, concepts, examples, etc.,described with reference to one or more of the embodiments discussedherein. Further, from figure to figure, the embodiments may incorporatethe same or similarly named functions, steps, modules, etc., that mayuse the same or different reference numbers and, as such, the functions,steps, modules, etc., may be the same or similar functions, steps,modules, etc., or different ones.

Unless specifically stated to the contra, signals to, from, and/orbetween elements in a figure of any of the figures presented herein maybe analog or digital, continuous time or discrete time, and single-endedor differential. For instance, if a signal path is shown as asingle-ended path, it also represents a differential signal path.Similarly, if a signal path is shown as a differential path, it alsorepresents a single-ended signal path. While one or more particulararchitectures are described herein, other architectures can likewise beimplemented that use one or more data buses not expressly shown, directconnectivity between elements, and/or indirect coupling between otherelements as recognized by one of average skill in the art.

The term “module” is used in the description of the various embodimentsof the present invention. A module includes a functional block that isimplemented via hardware to perform one or module functions such as theprocessing of one or more input signals to produce one or more outputsignals. The hardware that implements the module may itself operate inconjunction software, and/or firmware. As used herein, a module maycontain one or more sub-modules that themselves are modules.

While particular combinations of various functions and features of thepresent invention have been expressly described herein, othercombinations of these features and functions are likewise possible. Thepresent invention is not limited by the particular examples disclosedherein and expressly incorporates these other combinations.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for execution by a computing device forhighly secure access to a dispersed storage network (DSN), the methodcomprises: for a access request to the DSN, retrieving accessinformation by: retrieving a plurality of sets of encoded share slicesand a plurality of sets of encoded random number slices from memory ofthe DSN; dispersed storage error decoding the plurality of sets ofencoded share slices to produce a set of encrypted shares; dispersedstorage error decoding the plurality of sets of encoded random numberslice to produce a plurality of random numbers; obtaining one or morepersonalized authenticating values regarding user access to the DSN;processing the one or more personalized authenticating values and theplurality of random numbers to produce a set of decryption keys;decrypting the set of encrypted shares using the set of decryption keysto produce a set of shares; and processing the set of shares to recoverthe access information; and utilizing the recovered access informationto process the access request to the DSN.
 2. The method of claim 1further comprises: identifying, in accordance with security parameters,the plurality of sets of encoded share slices and the plurality of setsof encoded random number slices; sending a first set of retrievalrequests to the memory of the DSN regarding the plurality of sets ofencoded share slices; and sending a second set of retrieval requests tothe memory of the DSN regarding the plurality of sets of encoded randomnumber slices.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the processing the oneor more personalized authenticating values and the plurality of randomnumbers to produce the set of decryption keys comprises: generating aset of hidden passwords based on the one or more personalizedauthenticating values; generating a set of blinded passwords based onthe set of hidden passwords and a set of blinded random numbers;generating a set of passkeys based on the set of blinded passwords andthe set of recovered random numbers; and generating the set ofdecryption keys based on the set of blinded random numbers and the setof passkeys.
 4. The method of claim 3, wherein the generating the set ofhidden passwords comprises at least one of: transforming the set ofpersonalized authenticating values in accordance with a set oftransformation functions to produce a set of transformed personalizedauthenticating values; and for each password of the correspondingplurality of hidden passwords: combining, in accordance with a combiningfunction, one of the set of transformed personalized authenticatingvalues with at least one of a constant and another one of the set oftransformed personalized authenticating values to produce the password.5. The method of claim 3, wherein the generating the set of decryptionkeys comprises: generating a set of values based on the set of blindedrandom numbers; and generating the set of decryption keys based on theset of values and the set of passkeys.
 6. The method of claim 1, whereinthe processing the set of shares to recover the access informationcomprises at least one of: utilizing a Shamir secret sharing algorithmto decode the set of shares to recover the access information; anddispersed storage error decoding the set of shares to recover the accessinformation.
 7. A computing device comprises: an interface; memory; anda processing module operably coupled to the interface and the memory,wherein the processing module is operable to: for a access request tothe DSN, retrieve access information by: retrieving, via the interface,a plurality of sets of encoded share slices and a plurality of sets ofencoded random number slices from memory of the DSN; dispersed storageerror decoding the plurality of sets of encoded share slices to producea set of encrypted shares; dispersed storage error decoding theplurality of sets of encoded random number slice to produce a pluralityof random numbers; obtaining one or more personalized authenticatingvalues regarding user access to the DSN; processing the one or morepersonalized authenticating values and the plurality of random numbersto produce a set of decryption keys; decrypting the set of encryptedshares using the set of decryption keys to produce a set of shares; andprocessing the set of shares to recover the access information; andutilize the recovered access information to process the access requestto the DSN.
 8. The computing device of claim 7, wherein the processingmodule is further operable to: identify, in accordance with securityparameters, the plurality of sets of encoded share slices and theplurality of sets of encoded random number slices; send, via theinterface, a first set of retrieval requests to the memory of the DSNregarding the plurality of sets of encoded share slices; and send, viathe interface, a second set of retrieval requests to the memory of theDSN regarding the plurality of sets of encoded random number slices. 9.The computing device of claim 7, wherein the processing module isfurther operable to process the one or more personalized authenticatingvalues and the plurality of random numbers to produce the set ofdecryption keys by: generating a set of hidden passwords based on theone or more personalized authenticating values; generating a set ofblinded passwords based on the set of hidden passwords and a set ofblinded random numbers; generating a set of passkeys based on the set ofblinded passwords and the set of recovered random numbers; andgenerating the set of decryption keys based on the set of blinded randomnumbers and the set of passkeys.
 10. The computing device of claim 9,wherein the processing module is further operable to generate the set ofhidden passwords by at least one of: transforming the set ofpersonalized authenticating values in accordance with a set oftransformation functions to produce a set of transformed personalizedauthenticating values; and for each password of the correspondingplurality of hidden passwords: combining, in accordance with a combiningfunction, one of the set of transformed personalized authenticatingvalues with at least one of a constant and another one of the set oftransformed personalized authenticating values to produce the password.11. The computing device of claim 9, wherein the processing module isfurther operable to generate the set of decryption keys by: generating aset of values based on the set of blinded random numbers; and generatingthe set of decryption keys based on the set of values and the set ofpasskeys.
 12. The computing device of claim 7, wherein the processingmodule is further operable to process the set of shares to recover theaccess information by at least one of: utilizing a Shamir secret sharingalgorithm to decode the set of shares to recover the access information;and dispersed storage error decoding the set of shares to recover theaccess information.
 13. A computer readable storage device comprises: afirst section that stores operational instructions that, when executedby a computing device, causes the computing device to, for a accessrequest to the DSN, retrieve access information by: retrieving, via theinterface, a plurality of sets of encoded share slices and a pluralityof sets of encoded random number slices from memory of the DSN;dispersed storage error decoding the plurality of sets of encoded shareslices to produce a set of encrypted shares; dispersed storage errordecoding the plurality of sets of encoded random number slice to producea plurality of random numbers; obtaining one or more personalizedauthenticating values regarding user access to the DSN; processing theone or more personalized authenticating values and the plurality ofrandom numbers to produce a set of decryption keys; decrypting the setof encrypted shares using the set of decryption keys to produce a set ofshares; and processing the set of shares to recover the accessinformation; and a second section that stores operational instructionsthat, when executed by a computing device, causes the computing deviceto utilize the recovered access information to process the accessrequest to the DSN.
 14. The computer readable storage device of claim13, wherein the first section further stores operational instructionsthat, when executed by a computing device, causes the computing deviceto: identify, in accordance with security parameters, the plurality ofsets of encoded share slices and the plurality of sets of encoded randomnumber slices; send, via the interface, a first set of retrievalrequests to the memory of the DSN regarding the plurality of sets ofencoded share slices; and send, via the interface, a second set ofretrieval requests to the memory of the DSN regarding the plurality ofsets of encoded random number slices.
 15. The computer readable storagedevice of claim 13, wherein the first section further stores operationalinstructions that, when executed by a computing device, causes thecomputing device to process the one or more personalized authenticatingvalues and the plurality of random numbers to produce the set ofdecryption keys by: generating a set of hidden passwords based on theone or more personalized authenticating values; generating a set ofblinded passwords based on the set of hidden passwords and a set ofblinded random numbers; generating a set of passkeys based on the set ofblinded passwords and the set of recovered random numbers; andgenerating the set of decryption keys based on the set of blinded randomnumbers and the set of passkeys.
 16. The computer readable storagedevice of claim 15, wherein the first section further stores operationalinstructions that, when executed by a computing device, causes thecomputing device to generate the set of hidden passwords by at least oneof: transforming the set of personalized authenticating values inaccordance with a set of transformation functions to produce a set oftransformed personalized authenticating values; and for each password ofthe corresponding plurality of hidden passwords: combining, inaccordance with a combining function, one of the set of transformedpersonalized authenticating values with at least one of a constant andanother one of the set of transformed personalized authenticating valuesto produce the password.
 17. The computer readable storage device ofclaim 15, wherein the first section further stores operationalinstructions that, when executed by a computing device, causes thecomputing device to generate the set of decryption keys by: generating aset of values based on the set of blinded random numbers; and generatingthe set of decryption keys based on the set of values and the set ofpasskeys.
 18. The computer readable storage device of claim 13, whereinthe first section further stores operational instructions that, whenexecuted by a computing device, causes the computing device to processthe set of shares to recover the access information by at least one of:utilizing a Shamir secret sharing algorithm to decode the set of sharesto recover the access information; and dispersed storage error decodingthe set of shares to recover the access information.